_ __          =[ logica ]=            __ _

there are institutional logics that have an alternative truthvaluation of doublenegation.
there are free logics that provide for supervaluations in which some propostions are undecidable.
there are fractal logics with partial or modulating truthvalues.
there are modal, doxastic, deontological, dialectical, multivalent, and paraconsistent logics
there are anti-realist logics such as Mahayana Buddhism that *does* deny the reality of phenomenal existence, and yet Buddhism has gone pretty far.

Given these various models of human intellection, it is naive for one to suggest that a Western, classical, Aristotelian first-order statement logic is the only acceptable model available. One might rebut by stating that these various 'expressions' of logic vary, but that reality is what is. This is a weak response in that our conceptions of reality depends upon those very modes of intellection. As Alcuin has said:

"But surely one's conception of "what reality is" is dependent on, among other things, the conceptual frame of reference and axiological standards of inference that one brings to bear on investigation of "reality". This fact entails that your appeal to "the reality of existence" as understood through your preferred "normative inferential axiology" is merely your fancy leap of faith."

Again, one might rebut that such differences in human thought is merely semantic, not a difference in the perception of reality itself. Though this only reflects a lack of understanding of these various modes of intellection. Fractal logics have modulating truthvalues, classic Aristotelian logic does not, clearly this is not just a semantic difference. The choice of a Western logic over an Eastern logic simply because one happens to prefer the former is question begging to the extreme.

An opponent may suggest that these various modes of thought are purely theoretical, and not something demonstratable in experience. Thus undermining their validity in application. Though, this again only reflects a lack of familiarity with these other modes of thought. Some may present a straw man such as the claim that a, "...Hindu scholar flying to the West will certainly choose an aerodynamic sound plane over one that is defective, based on the laws of logic he wishes to argue against." This is a fallacious claim in that it ignorantly assumes that choosing an aerodynamically sound plane is contrary to a Hindu's mode of intellection, or that such a choice conforms better to a Western mode of thought better than to an Eastern. Such claims only indicate that the opponent is not in a position to debate these differences in human intellection.

Here are two examples of this line of reasoning:
·-= log 1 =-·
·-= log 2 =-·

Ryan Jankowski: Sunday, August 26th, 2001, 11:51am